The conflicting logics of cross-border reterritorialization: Geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe

Gabriel Popescu*

Department of Political Science, Indiana University South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Avenue, South Bend, IN 46634-7111, USA

Abstract

Europe is currently experiencing an unprecedented process of reterritorialization in the context of European Union integration. Central to this process is the implementation of various cross-border cooperation schemes, commonly known as Euroregions, aimed at redefining fixed, border-induced Westphalian territoriality. The literature on Euroregions has primarily examined the reterritorialization of state power and institutions across borders, documenting the emergence of cross-border governance networks. However, the territorial underpinning of cross-border reterritorialization, as well as the process of territorial constitution of cross-border spaces has been less well explored. This paper examines cross-border reterritorialization from a geopolitical perspective informed by multi-scalar conceptualizations of political territoriality. Actors at supranational, national and local scales often follow territorial logics that are at odds with each other. Competing meanings of territory and territoriality interact to produce a geopolitics of Euroregions that shapes cross-border reterritorialization. The paper focuses on the Euroregions established at the current fringes of the EU, in the Romanian–Ukrainian–Moldovan borderlands.

Keywords: Euroregions; Geopolitics; Cross-border reterritorialization; EU eastern borders

* Tel.: +1 574 520 4147; fax: +1 574 520 5208.
E-mail address: gpopescu@iusb.edu

0962-6298/$ - see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introducing cross-border reterritorialization

Nation-states are under pressure to find innovative ways to redefine their relationships with space. The traditional understanding of the state, as the ultimate repository of sovereignty over a bounded portion of the Earth’s surface and the society that inhabits it, is at odds with the current world of cross-border flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas. These developments require a much more subtle account of political territoriality.

On the one hand, it appears that politics and economics are de-territorializing. The bonds that tied politics, culture, and economics to national territories are loosened under globalization pressures. At the same time, there is a reterritorialization of economic and political activity that transcends the spatial framework of the nation-state (Sassen, 2006). Reterritorialization processes are generally understood as the restructuring of territorial forms of organization of social relations, such as the nation-state (Brenner, 1999a, 1999b). This implies the uncoupling of the exclusive links between state sovereignty and territory, as well as the emergence of territorial configurations beyond the scope and the scale of the nation-state.

Studies on border, cross-border regions and cross-border cooperation, address state territorial restructuring at the sub-national level. They have primarily examined the reterritorialization of state power and institutions across borders, documenting the emergence of cross-border governance networks and power relations (e.g., Anderson, O’Dowd, & Wilson, 2003; Kramsch & Hooper, 2004; Newman, 1999; O’Dowd & Wilson, 1996; Perkmann, 2002, 2003; Scott, 1999; Sparke, 1998, 2002a). The role played by state territoriality and territorial politics in cross-border reterritorialization has been less well explored. The territorial underpinning of cross-border reterritorialization, as well as the process of territorial constitution of cross-border spaces, remains largely unaddressed. This paper sets out to address this deficiency by examining cross-border reterritorialization from a geopolitical perspective informed by multi-scalar conceptualizations of political territoriality.

Europe is currently experiencing an unprecedented process of state reterritorialization in the context of European Union (EU) integration. Borders are identified as the locus of state territoriality and the EU together with European governments and local authorities are working to redefine their role by implementing various cross-border cooperation projects. Cross-border or transborder regions, commonly known in the European context as Euroregions or Euregios, have been created across state borders in order to decrease their role as barriers in an attempt to redefine fixed, border-induced state territoriality. Euroregions are territorial units spanning two or more state borders, where spatial patterns of social life can be organized irrespective of state borders to the benefit of the civil society (Murphy, 1993; Perkmann & Sum, 2002). Usually, they have formal governing institutions such as councils, secretariats and working groups, and some may even have their own symbols such as logos and flags. The EU supports Euroregions, invoking them as a model and an engine of European integration that help to reduce tensions between states and to alleviate regional economic disparities.

The aim of this article is to address the undertheorized relationship between competing meanings of territory and territoriality and the emergence of cross-border spaces in the context of European integration. It is important to understand how cross-border reterritorialization is unfolding and what new configurations of territory are built, by whom, and to what use. What role does political territoriality play in shaping the reterritorialization of the Westphalian system at the sub-national level in Euroregions? Are Euroregions emerging actors in a multi-tiered post-national political system that transcends the framework of traditional statehood, or are they tools used by nation-states and the EU to address limitations of Westphalian
territoriality? The newest EU borderlands between Romania and Ukraine and Romania and Moldova will provide the background to understand how the EU — nation-state — Euroregions nexus is playing out geopolitically to produce new spaces for social action beyond the nation-state’s territorial fix. The Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan borderlands are complex sites experiencing intense border regime changes in a relatively short period of time. Insightful parallels can be drawn between political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena at work in these borderlands and cross-border reterritorialization in other spatial contexts.

At the heart of current attempts to theorize processes of cross-border reterritorialization and rescaling via Euroregions is a sense that we are witnessing a changing meaning of space. Much scholarly attention has been paid lately to develop a theoretical understanding of cross-border region building by analyzing the processes of cross-border cooperation and cross-border regionalism (Kramsch, 2001, 2003; Leresche & Saez, 2002; Perkmann, 1999, 2003, 2007; Scott, 1999, 2000; Sidaway, 2001; Sparke, 2002a). This body of work draws on the larger interdisciplinary fields of border studies and regionalism that since the 1990s have experienced a post-structuralist turn that induced major breakthroughs in the conceptualization of borders and border regions.

Boundaries are viewed as undetermined, mutable, and socially constructed. Boundaries are now considered in their multidimensionality and are approached contextually (Häkli & Kaplan, 2002; Newman, 2003). The focus surpasses the borders per se, taking into account the broader areas, often called borderlands, where social phenomena induced by borders, such as perceptions, stereotypes and behaviors, are experienced (Martinez, 1994; Rumley & Minghi, 1991). At the same time, current approaches utilize social constructivist insights to explore how changing patterns of social interaction affect the role and the meaning of borders (Berg & Van Houtum, 2003; Kramsch & Hooper, 2004).

First, borders are seen as discursively constructed. Such approaches stress the production and reproduction of the idea of boundaries. Boundaries are not mirror-like reflections of the physical—cultural landscapes of territories, but are fabrications people make to legitimate distinctions between them (Eskelinen, Liikanen, & Oksa, 1999; Paasi, 1996). Second, borders are viewed as identity constitutive. Current literature on borders stresses the fact that the construction of collective territorial identity is not generated naturally but is achieved through the inscription of boundaries by exploiting us-versus-them type discourse (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Paasi, 1996). Third, borders are understood as a means of reifying power. Borders embody a variety of contradictions and conflicts that are the result of the arbitrary circumstances of boundary making. They render visible the power emerging from social and spatial relations (Newman & Paasi, 1998).

Current efforts to theorize regions and regionalism are grounded in the belief that the production and reproduction of regions as spaces for social life is part of a broader network of political, economic and cultural processes of production of space. (Allen, Massey, & Cochrane, 1998; Keating, 1998; MacLeod & Jones, 2001; Paasi, 2002; Storper, 1995; Thrift, 1990). The re-conceptualization of spatial processes of region formation materialized as the “new regional geography” which illustrates how, far from being simple containers of social life, regions are both sources and outcomes of spatial social relations that develop from the continuous interaction of multi-scalar actors in a territory (Thrift, 1983). Regions are historically contingent social constructions that give meaning to territories through a gradual process of institutionalization in the public consciousness (Paasi, 1996). They do not exist within neatly delineated boundaries, rather they are often fuzzy, overlapping, and temporal constructions.
Concerns regarding the processes of region formation are paralleled in political science and economic geography by the discourse of “new regionalism”, customarily described as a bottom-up regionalism emerging from local actors “in the form of regional political and economic mobilization” (Keating, 1995: 2). Most often, the new regionalist agenda is couched in terms of economic restructuring, emphasizing the significance of so-called “soft assets” of regions, such as regional social networks, local environment, regional cultural assets, and regional knowledge, for achieving competitive advantage in a world of flows. Thus, the sub-national region is increasingly regarded as a basis for economic, political, and social life “after mass production” (Storper, 1997).

As regions are increasingly important as a level of territorial administration, understanding their capacities as institutions of governance has come to be of central importance in making sense of the regionalization process (Bukowski, Piattoni, & Smyrl, 2003). The common belief is that new institutions of governance are required to manage the emerging regionalization processes (Schultz, Soderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001). These views are informative of the “new institutionalism” that is concerned with the capacity of regional governance to formulate, implement, and coordinate policies that could integrate and shape local interests to affect change in regions (Le Gales, 1998).

The concept of cross-border regions incorporates both regionalism and border theory. Of relevance here is the fact that processes that lead to region formation can take place both in spite of and because of the existence of state borders. At their turn, state borders influence, and are influenced by, their surrounding areas. These processes are known today as cross-border or transborder regionalism and the resulting regions are called cross-border or transborder regions. In essence, cross-border regionalism is based on a set of network-like multilevel cross-border interactions aimed at building institutions of governance able to organize social life in a transborder regional context (Perkmann, 2003). This transnational institution-building process is embedded in various cross-border cooperation regimes that provide the overarching regulatory framework for cross-border region building (Blatter, 2001). However, despite the theoretical strides in bringing together regionalism and border theory, the evidence from cross-border regions suggests that the relationship between region formation and state borders remains in a state of unresolved tension, as the latter retain considerable influence over patterns of spatial interaction.

The literature on cross-border regions relies on these interdisciplinary theoretical developments to conceptualize issues of regionalism-induced cross-border reterritorialization. Attempts to make sense of cross-border regions are grounded in two main theoretical perspectives. The first, coming mainly from political economy, which sees cross-border regions through the prism of capital accumulation, is largely skeptical of their potential as meaningful spaces of reterritorialization in their own right (Jessop, 2002; Sparke, 2002a, 2002b). The second is more permissive, crediting cross-border regions with some measure of agency, seeing in them innovative possibilities as spaces of reterritorialization (Kramsch, 2003; Murph, 1993; O’Dowd, 2002; Perkmann, 2007; Scott, 2000). However, these two perspectives should not be essentialized, as most authors acknowledge that cross-border regions are shaped somewhere between the structuring effects of capitalist accumulation strategies and the agency of local actors.

Cross-border regions constitute perhaps one of the most visible examples of contemporary territorial rearrangement in the Westphalian state system given their geographically dialectic position at the confines and at the contact between sovereign territories. Their significance for state reterritorialization lies in the fact that their emergence questions the theoretical foundations of the traditional Westphalian territorial logic of absolute state territorial sovereignty.
delineated by state boundaries. While there is significant consensus that cross-border institutions are currently too weak to change state territorial sovereignty (Jessop, 2002; O’Dowd, 2002; Sparke, 2002a), the very building of political-territorial units across nation-state borders signals the emergence of a process of political reterritorialization. First, when national governments agree to put together parts of their national territory to form a cross-border region, they implicitly endorse a new, separate territorial configuration that is beyond the exclusive sovereign reach of any single national government. Second, when national administrations or non-governmental actors participate in the institutionalization of cross-border regions, the new institutions exercise authority and power, as tenuous as that might be, beyond state borders. In essence, the territory of Euroregions represents more than the sum of nation-state territories that compose it, and cross-border institutions are more than the sum of national administrations forming them.

For the most part, research on Euroregions focuses primarily on their role as institutions of cross-border governance, while territorial issues are somewhat assumed and of secondary focus (Kepka & Murphy, 2002). Research that directly tackles the territorial aspects of cross-border regions is scarce, and is often hidden in empirical case studies. The view of Euroregions as institutional spaces rests on the premise that institutions are a means of governing territories, and therefore a means of organizing social life across territories. Governance provides the bond between institutions and territories needed to bridge different institutional systems and construct cross-border political communities. Documenting a certain measure of autonomy of governance network structures in these institutional spaces, suggests an uncoupling of state sovereignty from state territory. The institutional-governance approach casts Euroregions as spaces of reterritorialization where the principle of territoriality is weakening. Indeed, reterritorialization under the circumstances of less territorial networks of power would represent a more radical path to territorial change in the Westphalian system (Blatter, 2001). However, cross-border studies are largely silent with regard to the role territoriality plays in shaping cross-border governance networks.

I build on this emerging body of theory by addressing the emergence of Euroregions as new territorial formations rather than new institutional spaces, in an attempt to demonstrate how territory and territoriality are intrinsic factors in understanding cross-border reterritorialization processes. I examine the geopolitical significance of Euroregions in the complex process of changing meanings of state territoriality. I show how Euroregions have been conceived as territorial in nature, and how key actors involved in these spaces continue to imagine them as territorial in nature. I demonstrate how border-induced territoriality centralized in national governments influences cross-border institutionalization and governance, thus cross-border reterritorialization. In this light, the shortcomings of governance in Euroregions are a direct function of the nation-state’s territorial design limitations in providing solutions at the sub-national level beyond its borders, as well as a direct function of the EU strategies of spatial integration. To cope with such limitations, states engage in a complex geopolitics of territories that prevents networks of cross-border governance to achieve extensive autonomy from state apparatuses. At their turn, various EU policies aimed at European integration also have ambiguous effects on the capacity of cross-border institutions to engender less territorial paths to reterritorialization in Euroregions. The emerging picture suggests that reterritorialization in Euroregions remains informed to a considerable degree by territoriality principles and territorial politics.

In the remainder of this paper, I discuss the multi- and cross-scalar geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe and its relationship with competing imaginations of political territoriality. I will then examine how conflicting territorial logics in Euroregions impact on cross-border
reterritorialization in the Romanian–Ukrainian–Moldovan borderlands. I conclude by highlighting the relationship between territoriality in Euroregions and state territorial readjustment.

The geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe

Multi-scalar national, supra-, sub-, and transnational forces interact to produce the geopolitics of Euroregions shaping the dynamics of cross-border reterritorialization in the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan borderlands. This scalar model defies simplistic interpretations, as these forces do not follow a predetermined supra-, sub-, and national scalar matrix, but they are, rather, overlapping and intersecting in a complex pattern that blurs planar readings of scale.

The key actors behind Euroregion building in these borderlands are various EU institutions at the supranational scale, and the central governments at the national scale. The activities of borderland citizens and their local institutions generally play a more modest role at the subnational scale. Transnational institutions such as the Association of European Borderland Regions, as well as various NGOs may also be involved. These broad categories of actors often have competing territorial agendas rooted in distinct understandings of political territoriality. Their interests vis-à-vis borderlands only partially overlap.

EU geopolitical imagination and the Euroregions

The emergence of the EU geopolitical imagination revolved around the thinking of the European territory as a unified space representing more than the sum of its member states territories. To fulfill this spatial vision, the EU has traditionally operated with different territorial logics in different circumstances (Browning, 2003).

With the creation of the Single Market in the early 1990s, the EU’s regional policy emerged as the core strategy to reterritorialize the European space, and terms such as “cohesion”, “cross-border cooperation”, and “Europeanization of space” came to dominate the EU vocabulary. Such catchwords imply escaping the “territorial trap” of nation-state borders in order to allow the management of the EU space along new territorial logics. Passage of the Madrid Convention in 1980, as well as its Additional Protocol in 1995, provided a legal framework for sub-national authorities to engage in cross-border partnerships. This had a significant impact on border regions, offering escape from the straitjacket of national policies and opportunities for development in a wider European context.

During the early 1990s, cross-border cooperation became one of the most dynamic areas of EU regional policy (Christiansen & Jorgenson, 2000). By the late 1990s, there was not a single border in the EU that was not covered by some type of cross-border cooperation scheme (Jonsson, Tagil, & Tornqvist, 2000). In this context, Euroregions emerged as the most common form of institutionalized cross-border cooperation. The first Euroregions appeared in the 1960s in the Dutch–German borderlands and were primarily the outcome of bottom-up social action aimed at addressing issues of peripheralization generated by nation-state borders. The mid-1990s saw the EU, together with national governments, become actively involved in promoting and guiding the establishment of Euroregions, imagining them as part of a broader strategy addressing issues of a borderless European space in the making.

The process of integrating the east European post-communist states after 1989 constitutes another factor with significant impact on the development of EU geopolitics. The main strategy behind the EU’s enlargement policy was the eastward transfer of its spatial vision of European unification through encouraging a variety of interregional, cross-border, and transnational
institutional links between the EU member states and the East European applicant countries (Kennard, 2003). East European borderlands emerged as the sites where perceived security threats to stability in the EU space, such as immigration, organized crime, drugs, and human trafficking, could be contained and addressed (Anderson & Bort, 2001).

The EU policymakers came to see cross-border cooperation, institutionalized in the form of Euroregions, as one of the pillars of their enlargement policy. Euroregions were intended as a territorial framework where East Europeans would prepare for EU membership by practicing multilevel governance, learning to address cooperatively border-related issues, and working on reducing cross-border economic asymmetries (Scott, 2000; Yoder, 2003). EU funding schemes, such as INTERREG, TACIS, and PHARE, were designed to support the implementation of this strategy. In this context, by the early 2000s Euroregions straddled most of the east European national boundaries. In this way, the EU “space” of cross-border cooperation was extended to Eastern Europe before any of the countries in the region gained EU membership.

However, during the enlargement process the issue of the shifting EU eastern border emerged as a major controversy. Questions related to where this border should ultimately be established came to dominate EU geopolitics. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 incorporated a total of 12 East European countries and created an EU space of 27 member states extending from the Atlantic Ocean to beyond the borders of the former USSR. As the appetite for enlargement has significantly dwindled in the EU lately, it appears that the “traveling” eastern border will stabilize for an extended period of time at the eastern borders of the new EU member states, despite the fact that other east European countries such as Ukraine and Moldova continue to seek EU membership. Cultural and economic factors have gained renewed importance in defining who belongs and who does not belong in Europe, who are Europe’s Others. Increasingly, countries situated east of the newest EU members are depicted in the European geopolitical discourse as outsiders with little to no foreseeable chance of EU membership.

The massive enlargements of the 2000s have inspired the latest developments in the EU’s geopolitical imagination. First, the EU came in direct contact with new neighbors in the east that it did not envisage integrating in the short run. Second, the new EU members have vested interests with their eastern neighbors, and would prefer to see them integrated into the EU. Third, the EU has reached considerable mass as a global powerhouse, and this status prompted EU leaders to think beyond their immediate regional context to the organization’s place in world politics.

In 2003, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which aimed to create a framework for comprehensive partnership between the EU and its East and South European neighbors to assure the security and prosperity of the entire region by offering structural aid and enhanced political cooperation to address challenges arising from economic and political disparities between the EU and its neighbors (Emerson, 2004). Cross-border cooperation constitutes a major strategy of the ENP (Batt, 2003). Consequently, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which consolidates all previous EU structural funds, has been established to finance transnational and cross-border cooperation under the ENP framework. Out of an ENPI budget of approximately 12 billion Euros for the period 2007–2013, over 1.1 billion Euros are set aside specifically for supporting cross-border cooperation (ENPI, 2007). Euroregions are once again playing an important institutional role in supporting cross-border cooperation along the EU external borders and beyond. In effect, these Euroregions are expected to perform the same functions of the ones existing inside the EU space, yet under the contradictory circumstances of offsetting issues emerging from increasing the barrier functions of the eastern EU borders.
The ENP epitomizes the new EU geopolitical vision in which the EU projects “soft power” beyond its boundaries, prompting many to ask if we are witnessing the emergence of a post-Westphalian geopolitics in which concepts such as “collective security” and “positive interdependence” replace others such as “unilateral action” and “competing interests” (Scott, 2005). At the same time, the ENP has major implications for the traditional political territoriality of the Westphalian system, as it is promoting the multi-scalar EU spatial imagination beyond its borders.

However, the EU’s neighbors worry that the ENP is intended to deny them full EU membership in the future by trading closer economic and political integration with the EU for membership in the EU. The emphasis on the reinforcement of EU borders creates apprehension in EU neighboring countries that new “curtains” will be erected between them and the EU (Apap & Tchorbadjyska, 2004). The EU policymakers attempt to walk a tight rope between inclusion as embodied in their discourse on cross-border cooperation, and exclusion as embodied in their discourse of securizing the outer borders. It remains to be seen if the ENP will be able to bridge this dilemma.

Since the EU enlargement of 2007, Romania’s borders with Ukraine and Moldova coincide with the EU’s eastern borders for an approximate length of 1330 km. Until the late 1990s, the Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan borderlands were a low priority on the EU agenda. The EU focused predominantly on integrating its immediate neighboring borderlands of Poland, the Czech Republic, and others (Anderson & Bort, 2001). Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, as Romania progressed toward EU membership, the Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan borderlands had come into the spotlight of EU geopolitics.

The persistence of conflict in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria that turned the territory into a spring board for illegal activities directed toward the EU space, together with the potential export of political instability and of immigration from the CIS space to the EU member states, constitute factors that compelled the EU to become involved more actively in the region (Batt, 2003). To this end, the EU actively promoted and supported the establishment of Euroregions across the borderlands of Romania, Ukraine and Moldova by encouraging national governments to engage in Euroregion building and by creating financial programs to support cross-border cooperation. Currently, the Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan Euroregions play a central role in the implementation of the ENP policies serving as territorial interfaces between the EU and the former Soviet space. While formally the EU stops at Romania’s eastern borders, informally the Euroregions’ territory is tantamount to a territorial overlapping between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU space.

National geopolitics and the Euroregions

The complex circumstances of nation-state formation in Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova left sizeable ethnic minorities living in the borderlands of the neighboring states, while abrupt territorial changes led to contested borders throughout the region. Historically, borderlands in the region changed hands repeatedly between Romania and the Russian Empire (and later, the USSR). The current borders between Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine were established during and after World War II, and include, for the most part, territories that previously belonged to Romania and were lost to the USSR after the 1939 Ribbentrop—Molotov Pact (see Fig. 1). The northern and the southern areas (known as Northern Bucovina and Bugeac) were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, while the eastern part of the province of Moldova (known as Bessarabia) became the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Dima,
The latest border changes took place after the dismantling of the USSR in 1991. The border itself remained unchanged, but the adjacent borderlands that had belonged to the USSR became Ukrainian and Moldovan borderlands.

The emergence of Ukraine and Moldova in 1991 as independent states retaining the borders created during the soviet era significantly changed the geopolitical context of the region. National boundaries emerged as sensitive sites of security discourses where the new national identity was produced and reproduced. Both countries inherited many of the unsettled borderland issues that constantly strained Soviet—Romanian relations, such as the presence of large Romanian minorities. Moldova has a population of about 4 million, of which approximately 70% are of Romanian descent. The population of Romanian descent in Ukraine recorded in the last census of 2001 was 409,000, divided between Romanians (151,000) and Moldovans (258,000) (State Statistics Committee, 2001). At the same time, there exists a Ukrainian minority in Romania comprising around 61,000 inhabitants.

Romanian leaders generally welcomed the independence of Moldova and Ukraine, as they viewed them as buffers between Romania and Russia. However, the Romanian geopolitical imagination now faced a significant dilemma between maintaining good neighborly relations with the two new states and pursuing territorial claims against them. In the early 1990s, various Romanian political forces challenged Ukraine’s rights to the borderlands once lost to the USSR, making the Ukrainian government anxious regarding Romanian intentions toward Ukraine. Nonetheless, the Romanian government, well aware that open territorial claims would
undermine Romania’s chances to EU and NATO membership, followed a pragmatic approach in its relations with the Ukrainian counterpart and promoted collaboration on issues of common interest considered to outweigh existing disagreements (Crowther, 2000).

Romanian—Moldovan relations qualify as a “special relationship” given the history and cultural ties Romanians and Moldovans share (King, 2000). In the early 1990s, there were expectations the two countries would unite. Nonetheless, the hopes of union were short lived, as the Moldovan government, confronted with separatist movements, chose to follow an independent path. A discourse of “silent integration” ensued, in which Moldova and Romania continued to exist as separate states but maintained a privileged relationship that may lead to later unification. As a result, Moldovan and Romanian citizens did not need a passport to travel between the two countries, and Romania established an annual aid package for Moldova that included energy supplies, scholarships in Romania for Moldovan students, and the granting of Romanian citizenship to Moldovan citizens. However, bilateral relations declined after the 2001 elections, when the communist party came to power in Moldova and embarked on a series of measures aimed to redesign Moldovan identity as independent of Romanian identity (Skvortova, 2006).

Moldovan—Ukrainian relations are marked by a series of challenges, from finding a common approach to Transnistrian separatism, to determining the status of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova and of the Moldovan minority in Ukraine (Serebrian, 2002). While both governments have declared their goals of European integration, they try to navigate a delicate path between close relationships with Russia and the CIS space, and EU and NATO membership.

The legacy of border problems and the lack of previous cross-border cooperation influenced the perception of Euroregions in Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova. In the early 1990s, national governments in the region regarded the establishment of Euroregions as a matter of extending a country’s political control beyond its borders. In the context in which trust building among national governments was slowly advancing outside the EU umbrella, Euroregions were initially perceived as political instruments aimed at detaching border areas from one state and attaching them to another. Therefore, they were viewed as direct threats to the territorial integrity of the state, and national governments generally opposed their establishment (Negut, 1998).

During the early 1990s, the Romanian government perceived Euroregions as a direct threat to Romanian territory, and as devices conceived by Romania’s neighbors to dismantle Romania. To be sure, unsettled political issues between Romania and neighbors such as Hungary contributed to such a negative discourse. The Romanian leaders at the time were concerned by the fact that creating Euroregions involved territorial delineation and a certain degree of administrative local autonomy, and therefore, individualized political-territorial entities that the national government could not fully control.

However, this mentality had changed by the mid-1990s. Romania’s aspirations to join the EU gradually made Romanian leaders receptive to EU proposed cross-border cooperation policies. Ukrainian and Moldovan leaders understood as well that engaging in EU-endorsed cross-border cooperation with their western neighbors would result in closer relations with the EU that could bring them economic and political benefits (Prohnitski, 2002). National leaders in these countries realized that there were important benefits for their own bilateral and trilateral relations to be drawn from the establishment of Euroregions, provided national governments remain in charge in these newly created territories. First, Euroregions could in fact constitute a framework in which to cooperatively address contentious problems, even beyond the borderland dimension. Second, Euroregions’ potential to generate a measure of local economic
development was also seen as useful to address domestic issues in these countries, such as the economic malaise in the borderlands generated by the transition period and by the decades-long strict border regime between Romania and the USSR.

Before engaging in the establishment of Euroregions across their borders, the three governments had to take into consideration the complex implications of such an undertaking. Romania and Ukraine have several neighbors, thus there were additional borderlands to be considered as well. In the view of these two national governments, the establishment of Euroregions was a complex problem that necessitated an overarching approach that went beyond local interests. In the early 1990s, the Romanian leaders distrusted the intentions of the Hungarian government toward the Transylvania region, where there exists a significant Hungarian minority. Consequently, the Romanian government avoided the establishment of Euroregions across its western borders with Hungary.

At the same time, the Romanian government was in favor of establishing Euroregions across its eastern borders with Ukraine, where a significant Romanian minority lives. Yet, establishing Euroregions in the east would create a precedent that would signal there were no specific reasons to prevent them from being established in the West as well. In the case of Ukraine, the national government also had to weigh between engaging in Euroregion building at its western borders with Romania or with Poland, and the prospect of establishing such territorial structures in the east, across the borders with Russia, where Russian influence is substantial.

In these circumstances, national governments proceeded to institutionalize cross-border cooperation only after a period of time in which they concluded a series of inter-governmental agreements and treaties that served as a base for building a certain amount of trust among them. Key among these is the 1997 bilateral treaty between Romania and Ukraine that included mutual recognition of state borders and stipulated the creation of Euroregions aimed to preserve ethnic minorities inhabiting their borderlands.

The Romanian government saw these Euroregions as an “exchange” for renouncing territorial claims against Ukraine, as the correlation of these two issues in the treaty indicates. The Ukrainian government accepted the deal since it settled an important issue the young Ukrainian state faced in its western borderlands. Subsequently, the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan presidents met in Izmail, a border town on the Ukrainian side of the Danube Delta, to launch trilateral Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan cooperation that included the establishment of tripartite Euroregions (Ilies, 2004).

The attention that institutionalized cross-border cooperation received from the three national governments had profound implications for the subsequent performance of the Euroregions established across their borders. Generally, the process of establishing Euroregions has been a top-down, high stakes enterprise led by the central governments. Romania imagined Euroregions across its eastern borders primarily as mechanisms for maintaining institutionalized contacts with its co-ethnics in Ukraine and Moldova. Additionally, the establishment of Euroregions was “proof” that the EU membership-seeking Romanian government genuinely embraced EU strategies aimed at reterritorializing the European space.

Ukraine envisioned Euroregions established across its western borders as gateways to European integration. After its independence, Ukraine found itself in a precarious geopolitical position between a Russia trying to redefine its hegemony in the post-Soviet space and an EU concerned with potential security threats coming from the post-Soviet space (Kuzio, 1998). To consolidate its independence, Ukraine was in need of political openings to the West. For most of the 1990s, Ukraine remained outside the various western mental maps that redesigned the European space, lacking direct cooperation with the EU. In these circumstances, cross-border
cooperation in Euroregions was among the few options the Ukrainian government had in order to partake in European affairs. The perceived need to open Ukraine to the West outweighed the perceived dangers Euroregions across contested borderlands posed for the Ukrainian government. Participation in these Euroregions has been a choice of opportunity for the Ukrainian government.

For Moldova, sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, Euroregions represented a necessity for its prospects of security and development. The Moldovan government’s lack of control over the eastern part of the country for more than a decade and the strong Russian military presence there, together with its dependence on resources from the post-Soviet space, indicates that Moldova has but few choices in international politics. Its landlocked status weakens Moldova’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Ukraine and Romania, and the lack of membership in European organizations meant that the country has long been left outside the European imagination. Euroregions were perceived as having the potential to increase Moldova’s possibilities in international politics, and as serving to anchor the country into a western system of cooperation, even if not as important as the EU or NATO.

Such geo-strategic understanding of the role of Euroregions left little room for local input into the creation of Euroregions and into their territorial make-up. For the most part, the contribution of the local authorities to the establishment of Euroregions has been limited to reacting to the national and supranational cross-border cooperation policies. The establishment of Euroregions across the borderlands of Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova resembled more a national strategy for political and economic development than a grassroots demand, in a localized context, for overcoming constrictive nation-state borders in order to create novel spaces of living capable of better fulfilling the aspirations of borderland citizens.

Performing the geopolitics of Euroregions

Supra- and sub-national geopolitical imaginations largely shaped the implementation of four Euroregions along the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan borderlands. While these Euroregions are technically national creations, the EU influence on their establishment has been crucial given the national governments’ goals of European integration. The Carpathian Euroregion, established in 1993 along the Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, Slovakian, and Romanian borderlands, was the first created exclusively between post-communist countries (Baranyi, 2006). Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova established the Lower Danube Euroregion in 1998, followed by the Upper Prut Euroregion in 2000. After 2002, when Romania and Moldova established the Siret–Prut–Nistru Euroregion, the Romanian–Ukrainian–Moldovan borderlands were entirely covered by institutional structures of cross-border cooperation (see Fig. 2).

Carefully crafted territorial and ethnic geopolitical strategies pervade the implementation of these Euroregions. The establishment ceremonies of the Carpathian Euroregion were attended by the foreign ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine, local representatives from Romania and Slovakia, as well as representatives from the Council of Europe (Negut, 1998). However, Romanian national leaders were not consulted during the preliminary phases of the project, and they felt they had no input in its design (Deica & Alexandrescu, 1995). The Romanian government openly opposed the participation of Romanian borderlands in this Euroregion, and fired the local representatives present at the establishment ceremonies. The main objection was related to the Euroregion’s large size, in which the Hungarian share of the territory and population amounted to over a quarter of the total territory and population of Hungary. This, as well as
the presence of Hungarian minorities in neighboring borderlands that were once part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, gave the Euroregion an overtly Hungarian character. Romanian participation in the Euroregion became official only in 1997 after Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations improved considerably. Thereafter, five additional Romanian counties, four of which having considerable Romanian majorities, joined the initial two (Maramures and Satu Mare) in the Carpathian Euroregion.1

The Ukrainian government welcomed the creation of the Euroregion. At the establishment ceremony, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zelenco commented on its significance for his country by declaring that Ukraine was “entering the process of European integration” (Burant, 1995: 1130). However, Ukrainian leaders were concerned about potential secessionist tendencies in the multiethnic Transcarpathia (Zakarpatska) district which had a considerable Hungarian minority (Jordan & Klemencic, 2004). Subsequently, three additional large provinces with Ukrainian majorities joined the Euroregion (see Fig. 2).

Today, the Carpathian Euroregion is a mega-region, with a territory comparable in size to Greece (three times larger than Slovakia) and with a population of 16 million. Given that, in most cases the new territorial additions had little in common with cultural and socio-economic

---

1 The Slovakian government adopted a similar position due to its concerns about the Hungarian minority inhabiting the Slovak borderlands. The Slovak authorities did not formally participate in the Carpathian Euroregion until 1997, when several additional counties with Slovak majorities joined the Euroregion.
characteristics of borderlands, smaller Euroregions are now forming inside the territory of the Carpathian Euroregion (Baranyi, 2006), creating a “Euroregions within a Euroregion” pattern.

Similar geopolitical practices can be noticed in the case of the Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan Euroregions. Romania was particularly interested in the creation of these Euroregions given the presence of ethnic Romanians in the Romanian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian borderlands. However, this gave the Upper Prut and the Lower Danube Euroregions an overwhelmingly Romanian character, a fact that made some Ukrainian leaders uneasy about their existence. In 2002, an additional Ukrainian province (Ivano-Frankovsk) with a majority Ukrainian population joined the Upper Prut Euroregion, bringing the Ukrainian territorial participation to more than 50% of the total area of the Euroregion.

In the Lower Danube Euroregion, the geography is such that the Ukrainian Odessa province is divided into two distinct parts (separated by the Moldovan territory) between which communication is rather difficult (see Fig. 2). The southern part previously belonged to Romania and it is one of the most multiethnic Ukrainian regions today, while the eastern part has a higher percent of ethnic Ukrainians. However, the entire Odessa province (roughly the size of Belgium) was included in this Euroregion, bringing the Ukrainian territorial participation to more than 60% of the total area and population. In land area and population, both Euroregions are larger than Moldova (Ilies, 2004).

The Siret—Prut—Nistru Euroregion appears to have been established mainly to achieve extensive coverage of the Moldovan territory by institutionalized cross-border cooperation. The Euroregion encompasses half of the territory and population of Moldova, and includes the capital city of Chisinau. Currently, Euroregions cover over 70% of Moldova’s territory and approximately 80% of its population (Prohnitski, 2002).

The establishment of Euroregions raised unprecedented territorial challenges for Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova. All three states had to make an effort of political-territorial imagination to manage them. For the most part, the national governments attempted to minimize perceived loss of territorial sovereignty in their borderlands. Generally, national administrations are not involved directly in Euroregions’ daily governance. Rather, these governments’ clout results from their preeminent power position in a system dominated by nation-states. For example, significant cross-border infrastructure projects such as bridges and ferry terminals require services typically provided by the national governments such as customs, legislative bills, and massive investments. In the absence of assistance from national institutions, the local authorities remain quite limited in their capacities to undertake effective cross-border cooperation actions.

The conflict of territorial logics in Euroregions

The geopolitics of Euroregions suggests that cross-border reterritorialization across the latest EU borders is driven by a scalar conflict of territorial logics. The border-induced territorial logic of the nation-state conflicts with the border-bridging territorial logic of cross-border cooperation (Browning, 2003). This dialectical relationship is negotiated at the state borders. The Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan governments understand the benefits Euroregions may bring to their borderlands. However, they face a complex dilemma as the governments weigh these benefits against the interests of the larger territorial unit represented by the state. In this context, they cannot allow their borderlands to follow special rules without compromising the theoretical model of the territorial container that the nation-state follows (Taylor, 1994). Euroregions for their part need exemptions from national regulation in order to be able to function meaningfully across state borders. For nation-states, the importance of borders is
paramount — for Euroregions, state borders are fundamentally disruptive. It is here, at this junc-
tion, that cross-border reterritorialization takes place.

The conflict of territorial logics explains why national governments attempt to undermine
Euroregions even as they promote them. The view of the national governments is less about
Euroregions becoming integrated territorial units of social life and more about using them as
a framework to address the limitations of Westphalian territoriality. The reason that the Ukrai-
nian and Romanian national leaders included additional administrative units in the territorial
make-up of Euroregions was to prevent the ethnic make-up of these Euroregions from becom-
ing “too Romanian” or “too Hungarian” (Ilies, 2004), although this came at the expense of
assuring a consistent measure of territorial cohesion in the Euroregions. Furthermore, the
unwillingness of national governments to consider any other territorial alternatives apart
from using the existing national administrative subdivisions as the territorial base for these
Euroregions reflects their apprehension in creating new domestic territories whose main raison
d’être is outward oriented.

Another illustration of the mismatch between the national and the Euroregion territorial
logics emerges in the manner in which national policies toward borderlands are conceived.
When Romania and Ukraine passed bilateral legislation in 2003 enacting certain border cross-
ing benefits for borderland inhabitants, such as special visa types, the territorial reach of these
benefits generally included only counties immediately adjacent to the inter-state border (Acord,
2003). However, as Euroregions are often comprised of counties that are not border-counties
per se, such as Braila in the Lower Danube Euroregion, it would seem appropriate that their
inhabitants take advantage of the same benefits regarding the border crossing regime. The
reluctance of the national governments to articulate coherent policies vis-à-vis Euroregions
is suggestive of the former’s understanding of Euroregions as policy frameworks rather than
as meaningful spatial entities.

The supranational territorial logics of various EU institutions and policies and the cross-
border logic of Euroregions appear to display considerable synergy. The EU desires strong
Euroregions to support the reterritorialization of the European space. Simultaneously, Eurore-
gions thrive in a regulatory environment that downplays the barrier function of state borders
(Jonsson et al., 2000). However, we are witnessing today a radical change in the Euroregions
straddling the EU external borders. The logic of various EU policies conflicts with the logic of
Euroregions to such an extent that the EU can be considered one of the major disruptive forces
that cross-border reterritorialization has to overcome. In the past few years, the border regime
between Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova has changed from lax to restrictive due to the arrival
of the EU borders in the region. Security concerns expressed in the active tightening of the EU
external border regime increasingly trump the EU’s spatial visions of European integration. In
the short and medium term, such developments increase the difficulty of creating an integrated
space across the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan borders.

Lately, events related to EU expansion such as the imposition of travel visas by Romania for
Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens, as well as other trade-related restrictions, are of utmost
concern in the borderlands of the three countries (Skvortova, 2006). Restrictive visa policies
already undermine the performance of Euroregions as well as the intensity of interpersonal con-
tacts. Participation in cross-border cultural events intended to promote interethnic understand-
ing has declined since the borderland inhabitants need visas to cross the state border to the other
side of the Euroregions. For example, the visa requirement prevented the participation of a large
Ukrainian delegation of folk artists in the 2005 Interethnic Forum of the Lower Danube Euro-
region, held in Tulcea, Romania (Divers, 15 Septembrie 2005). In the Upper Prut Euroregion,
benefits enacted by the local authorities such as exempting Euroregion’s inhabitants from paying certain taxes at border crossing checkpoints, had to be rolled back after Romania joined the EU in 2007 since such matters are regulated at the EU level (Obiectiv de Suceava, 12 Ianuarie, 2007). In the Lower Danube Euroregion, the tri-national Galati–Giurgiulesti–Reni Free Economic Zone established along the Danube after years of complex negotiations between local and national authorities will have to cease its existence by 2012. Romania will have to terminate the “tax free” status of the port city of Galati in order to comply with EU regulation (Chomette, 2001).

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the synergy between EU and Euroregions’ territorial logics. Additional supranational policies are needed to address issues the presence of EU borders in the Romanian–Ukrainian–Moldovan neighborhood raises. Many EU policymakers are increasingly viewing Euroregions along these borders primarily as territorial policy tools to implement the organization’s new geopolitical imagination, rather than viewing them primarily as transnational partners in reterritorializing the European space.

The above examples illustrate that both the EU policymakers and the national governments are designing cross-border policies with little consideration for the interests of borderlands. It appears that the degree of support for cross-border cooperation is contingent on the convergence of interests at supranational and national scales with the interests of borderland inhabitants. The latter partake to a lesser extent in the design of cross-border policies affecting them.

However, local agents in Euroregions should not be seen as passive in the process of cross-border reterritorialization. Borderland inhabitants react to these scalar policies in ways that change their dynamics and produce their modification. Once Euroregions were established, the local authorities became more deeply involved in the daily process of governance, establishing an interpersonal network of local elites that appears fairly integrated at the cross-border level. The civil society developed unpredicted cross-border relationships that actively shape the spatial patterns of interaction in Euroregions. Such patterns tend to overlook distant areas and to focus on borderland locales where shared interests can be identified, thus “correcting” the national territorial geopolitics and in effect creating smaller, most often informal, Euroregions.

Borderland inhabitants in Moldova and Ukraine react to the strict EU visa policies curtailing their freedom of movement by acquiring Romanian citizenship and passports in order to breach the “paper wall” (Berg & Ehin, 2006).2 Given the fact that a large number of Moldovan and Ukrainian borderland inhabitants are believed to have already obtained Romanian passports, it is often assumed that the impact of the Schengen visa regime on the borderlands would be diminished to a certain extent. Additionally, there is an increase in the number of Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens establishing permanent residence in the Romanian borderlands in order to avoid the complex Schengen visa application process they would have to undergo if they choose to reside in Moldova and Ukraine.

The conflicting territorial logics driving the geopolitics of Euroregions at the fringes of the EU space are deeply rooted in conventional understandings of political territoriality. National as well as numerous supranational actors conceived of Euroregions along the lines of state territoriality templates. They imagined them as new territories offering opportunities to overcome the limitations of current territorial arrangements. Consequently, Euroregions emerged as

---

2 Liberal Romanian citizenship laws allow Romanian ethnics living in neighboring countries to apply for Romanian citizenship. Although there are no official data, unofficial estimates situate the number of Moldovan citizens that have already acquired Romanian citizenship at approximately 400,000.
territories in competition with the nation-states attempting to control them. This explains in
large part the governance and democracy deficit in these Euroregions, translated into their
less than expected performance to date as spaces of reterritorialization. There is paramount
emphasis placed on the territorial dimension of Euroregion building that the re/actions of the
borderland inhabitants are attempting to amend.

However, the Euroregions along the latest EU borders are more than mere policy tools. The
very exercise of putting together parts of the national territory to build a new cross-border
territory, as well as the instances when the national governments, the local leaders, and the
supranational institutions negotiate issues related to these Euroregions, implicitly endorse
Euroregions as territories beyond the territorial logic of any specific spatial configuration, either
national or supranational. Moreover, the functioning of the Euroregions already influences
spatial social relations in the region: national legal systems have been modified to facilitate
cross-border cooperation; small-scale cross-border economic investments are taking place;
and cross-border planning of various social, economic, and cultural policies is occurring (Ilies,
2004). While these Euroregions are not unified spaces outside the nation-state and the EU’s
hegemony, they are territories experiencing an ongoing process of reterritorialization in
a multi-scalar spatial context.

Conclusion

At the core of the emergence of Euroregions has been the issue of addressing the limitations
of Westphalian territoriality under the circumstances of accelerated globalization. The relation-
ships between political territoriality and the spatiality of social relations are being renegotiated
through a process of territorial integration of the European states that takes place at a variety of
scales. At a regional scale, we are witnessing processes of readjustment of the territorial organ-
ization of nation-states that include the emergence of cross-border territories (Anderson,
1996). These developments point to the fact that we are witnessing a reterritorialization of
the European space that can lead to the diversification of political-territorial social relations
beyond the traditional nation-state (Brenner, 1999a).

During the 1990s, the emergence of Euroregions along the Romanian—Ukrainian—Moldovan
borderlands signaled that the process of cross-border reterritorialization was under way in the
region. However, the process of building cross-border spaces is complex and contentious, and
its outcomes are ambiguous and contingent (Sidaway, 2001). Conflicting territorial logics
between the nation-state and Euroregions as well as between the EU and Euroregions shape
these Euroregions as cross-border spaces. A geopolitics of Euroregions emerged from the
encounter between the EU’s goals of building a unified European space and its perceived
need to reinforce its external borders on the one hand, and the interests of the nation-states
in preserving their territorial sovereignty and their need for institutionalized cross-border
cooperation on the other hand.

Supra, sub, and national considerations came together in the geopolitics of Euroregions;
a geopolitics of territories that is a hybrid of political tool and localized cross-border coopera-
tion. Euroregions emerged as a sort of territorial fix of the moment to fulfill the territorial
needs of the state and of the EU. The national governments embarked upon the establishment
of Euroregions much in the same way they would approach any other inter-governmental issue
in foreign policy. The establishment of Euroregions became a geopolitical undertaking in which
pro and contra arguments were carefully analyzed by the national governments, and in which
territories that were to become part of Euroregions were delineated following national
priorities. After 2003, the EU’s ENP policy imagined these Euroregions as springboards toward the former Soviet space, augmenting the complexity of the cross-border reterritorialization context in the region. These circumstances led to an overtly top–down Euroregion building process, in which local authorities had little input and local interests were often sacrificed. Nonetheless, local actors’ reactions to the policies regulating Euroregions manage at times to amend this geopolitics to better suit their interests.

Euroregions along the latest EU borders constitute political transnational spaces situated beyond the territorial logic of either the nation-states or the supranational organizations, yet they are far from being autonomous political-territorial units in the world political system. Although the functioning of these Euroregions signals the loosening of the straitjacket of the Westphalian territoriality principle, cross-border reterritorialization fundamentally involves territoriality as a concept, as Euroregions are shaped to a large extent by territorial considerations. At least for the moment, cross-border reterritorialization carries with it the inherent contradictions of the Westphalian territoriality, rather than solving them.

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Indiana University South Bend Faculty Research Grant program in supporting this research. Much gratitude is also due to Cristina Scarlat, Center for Advanced Spatial Technologies at the University of Arkansas, for her contribution of cartography to this article.

References


